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Movement Capture or Movement
Strategy? A Critical Race History
Exchange on the Beginnings of Brown v.
Board
Megan Ming Francis & John Fabian Witt
In 2019, Megan Ming Francis published a path-breaking article
challenging the conventional wisdom in the field on a core piece of civil
rights history: the role of a philanthropic foundation called the American
Fund for Public Service, also known as the Garland Fund, in working
alongside the NAACP to produce the organization’s famous litigation
campaign leading to Brown v. Board of Education. Starting in the late
1920s and early 1930s, education came to occupy a central place in the
NAACP’s agenda, and education desegregation became the focus of its
efforts to break the back of Jim Crow. In Francis’s provocative account, the
predominantly white Garland Fund captured the agenda of the civil rights
organization through its financial influence, shifting the organization’s
central focus from racial violence toward education equality. An
organization that had been focused on protecting Black lives from white
violence reoriented its attention to a new campaign, which siphoned off
resources from other projects, such as workers’ economic rights and Black
labor concerns.
In this exchange, Francis and legal historian John Fabian Witt debate
exactly who captured whom in the relationship between the NAACP and the
Garland Fund. Their exchange engages method and substance in the
history of civil rights. Among other things, Witt contends that the NAACP’s
leadership also subtly coopted the Garland Fund’s resources and turned
them toward the civil rights organization’s preexisting objectives rather
than vice versa. In Witt’s account, the NAACP figured out how to advance
its agenda through the Garland Fund, and the efforts of the two
organizations became co-joined. The Francis-Witt debate has important
implications for our understanding of the paths taken and not taken during
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the civil rights movement, how social mobilization came to focus on formal
legal doctrine rather than concrete social or political ends, and whether the
law can truly be turned against systems of oppression. Whichever account
is correct, the aftereffects of the NAACP-Garland Fund relationship still
reverberate today.
The exchange proceeds with an opening statement by Francis, and reply
by Witt, and a surreply by Francis, and a closing note from Witt.
Dear John,
The story behind the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People’s (NAACP) campaign against segregated education that
culminated in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision has been
told many times before—and been told well.1 Standard treatments of the
NAACP’s education desegregation campaign often focus on Charles
Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall as well as the three-pronged
litigation master plan they erected along with others at the NAACP.2 In this
version of events, strategic decisions are venerated, Marshall is lionized,
and victory in Brown seems to be the certain outcome of a carefully planned
and executed litigation strategy. While pervasive and compelling, this
narrative is incomplete. There is an incessant assumption, embedded in
much of the civil rights literature, that education was the most logical way
to break the back of Jim Crow. The belief is so powerful that many accounts
of the civil rights movement begin in 1954 with the Brown v. Board of
Education victory. However, the fact the NAACP mounted a campaign
against segregated education and secured the most significant Supreme
Court decision in civil rights law does not explain why it did so. Rarely
asked is the important question: In a time in which racial discrimination
permeated every aspect of American society—why did the NAACP choose
to focus its litigation campaign on the area of education?
A major but under-recognized reason, I propose in a new study, The Price
of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture, is
1. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); KENNETH MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE
CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012); CHARLES OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004); JAMES
PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED
LEGACY (2001); MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
2. Note on terminology: The NAACP and the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund (LDF) are two separate
organizations. The origins of LDF can be traced to the legal department that Charles Hamilton Houston
helped to enlarge as part of the Garland Fund grant in the 1930s. In 1940, Thurgood Marshall (a protégée
of Houston) established LDF as a separate legal entity due to tax concerns. It was not until 1957, after
the Brown v. Board decision, that the LDF became independent from the NAACP. As a result of the
timeline of the article, which focuses on the formulation of the grant, I will refer to the NAACP and not
the LDF. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Garland Fund had a lasting impact on the trajectory
of both organizations.
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directly connected to movement capture—the process by which private
funders use their influence in an effort to shape the agenda of vulnerable
civil rights organizations.3 Drawing on economic theories of regulatory and
state capture, I use capture as a way to understand how private funders
operate like interest groups or private firms, to buy influence over the goals
and strategies of activists and cause lawyers. According to this framework,
funders are self-interested actors that can exploit their elevated financial
position by linking provision of funds to the pursuit of new goals or by
shifting the salience of existing agenda issues. The movement capture
framework draws our attention to power asymmetries between wealthy
donors and legal mobilization organizations that are in need of resources.
In the article, I argue the Garland Fund (known for funding the education
desegregation litigation which culminated in Brown v. Board) engaged in a
process of movement capture whereby it used its abundant financial
resources to incentivize a shift in the NAACP’s agenda away from racial
violence to education. While I propose a contentious account, the traditional
story of the Garland Fund’s relationship with the NAACP is much more
sanguine. The conventional story follows: the interests of the Garland Fund
and the NAACP converged around the issue of segregated schools in the
South and the Garland Fund bankrolled the litigation campaign. This
funding story even has a fairytale ending: the collapse of legalized Jim Crow
in the area of education. Unfortunately, this well packaged narrative hides
a more complicated one: the marginalization of racial violence concerns
from the NAACP’s litigation agenda.
While there has been an important wave of studies focused on expanding
the world of civil rights making and NAACP organizing before Brown v.
Board, this time period is still significantly underdeveloped.4 Often, the
NAACP’s campaign against racial violence is either overlooked or
dismissed as unrealistic in the context of Jim Crow America. To be clear, I
am not asking a retrospective question about the feasibility of a racial
violence campaign today; I am asking what looked possible from the
standpoint of Black leaders at the NAACP in the time period before a formal
legal campaign against segregated education was launched. My aim was to
reconstruct the struggles between the NAACP and the Garland Fund as they
3. Megan Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Politics, White Money, andMovement Capture,
53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2019).
4. For important studies see: TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012); SUSAN CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE (2013);
PAUL FRYMER. BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008); RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007);
JEFFREY GONDA, UNJUST DEEDS: THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2015); SOPHIA LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO
THE NEW RIGHT (2014); KENNETH MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER (2012); LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016).
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experienced them—using the actors’ own language. It was to understand
the NAACP’s leadership as activists trying to chart the course of civil
rights—rather than cast them as willing participants in an education-
centered civil rights movement from the outset. Widening the analytical
lens helped to illuminate not just movement capture but also the broader
framework of racial power and how it structured the actions taken by the
Garland Fund elite as well as the more vulnerable NAACP leadership as
they negotiated the future of civil rights. The focus on racial power owes to
seminal scholarship in the field of critical race theory, which has long
argued that the exercise of racial power is “systemic and ingrained” in legal
institutions, discourse, and society.5 Critical race theorists have made plain
that racial domination can be reproduced in liberal institutions by well-
meaning actors.
* * *
The article provides a historical case study on the NAACP/Garland Fund
relationship from 1923 to 1930. The timeframe is critical, as before 1923,
the NAACP mounted the largest campaign in history against lynching and
mob violence. Focused on the protection of Black lives from state-
sanctioned violence, the NAACP organized mass demonstrations,
advocated for an anti-lynching bill in Congress, and wonMoore v. Dempsey
(1923), a landmark criminal procedure decision in the Supreme Court that
reversed the death sentences of six African American men in Arkansas.
According to the NAACP, the protection of Black lives from state and
individual white violence was the pinnacle civil rights struggle of the 20th
century. However, by 1925, the NAACP was severely underfunded and
without a big donor to support its anti-lynching activism.6
Meanwhile, the Garland Fund was the vanguard of left wing philanthropy
in the early twentieth century. The Fund began in 1922 after Roger Baldwin
convinced Charles Garland to accept his $1 million inheritance and put it to
use in a national trust “directed to social and economic freedom” of the
masses. Baldwin quickly assembled a board of directors that became a
roster of notable white radicals: communists, labor activists, feminists,
suffragettes, and socialists. And there was one African American: James
Weldon Johnson. The stewards of the Garland Fund endeavored to
5. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND THE LAW (1972); KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995).
6. For accounts of the development of the NAACP see the following: SUSAN CARLE, DEFINING THE
STRUGGLE (2013); MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN STATE (2014); LANGSTON HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (1962); 1 CHARLES FLINT
KELLOGG, NAACP A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE: 1909-1920 (1967); B. JOYCE ROSS, J.E. SPINGARN AND THE RISE OF NAACP, 1911-1929
(1972); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2009).
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primarily impact the areas of labor and education.7
It is important to note that the battle against racist violence paved the way
for the NAACP’s later campaign against segregated education by
establishing an important relationship with the Garland Fund and by
showcasing the usefulness of courts in the struggle for equality. If the
NAACP had not engaged in a national struggle to end lynching, there may
have been no Brown because the relationship that led to the funding of the
education desegregation campaign was established much earlier, when the
NAACP was working against racial violence. The first grant and second
grant from the Garland Fund occurred in 1922 and 1923 to support the
NAACP in its anti-lynching campaign. In other words, the publicity the
NAACP garnered from its national work in the anti-lynching campaign
drew the attention of the Garland Fund and led to a grant of $2,500 and an
additional appropriation of $865.50 to provide publicity to assist in passing
the Dyer Anti-lynching Bill in Congress.8 Subsequently, ads were taken out
in major newspapers across the United States to urge readers to contact their
senators in support of the anti-lynching bill.
A few months after the anti-lynching bill died in a Senate committee, the
importance of litigation was impressed upon the Garland Fund after the
NAACP’s Supreme Court victory in Moore v. Dempsey. As one of the
NAACP’s leaders would write afterward, “The Supreme Court decision in
this notable case thus becomes one of the milestones in the Negro’s fight
for justice—an achievement that is as important as any event since the
signing of the Emancipation Proclamation.”9 TheMoore victory was almost
everything the Garland Fund wanted from its grantees: it was a decision of
tremendous national significance and brought about by an oppressed
minority. The only aspect it was missing was an explicit focus on organized
labor or education: the two areas the Garland Fund was most interested in
supporting.
The Garland Fund’s issue priorities presented a unique set of hurdles to
the NAACP as they did not seamlessly map onto the NAACP’s agenda. In
fact, it appeared as if the central interests of the two organizations were
misaligned. By 1924, the NAACP was mostly concerned with racial
violence not education—to the extent that education-related issues were
rarely mentioned in board meetings. NAACP board minutes are particularly
elucidative (see TABLE 1 below), showing how the NAACP mostly
focused on racial violence every year from 1911 to 1931. Even local
7. Statement of Policy (Aug. 10, 1922) (on file with American Fund for Public Service Papers
[hereinafter AFPS Papers], reel 2).
8. An appropriation of $2,500 was voted on October 11, 1922 for an educational campaign in connection
with the Federal Anti-Lynching Campaign. An additional appropriation of $865.50 was voted on and
approved on January 24, 1923. Applications Favorably Acted Upon (on file with AFPS Papers, reel 10,
box 15).
9. Walter White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259, 261 (1923).
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NAACP branches were mostly concerned about racial violence as
evidenced by an increase in letters and local branch reports. However, after
1931 there is a sharp shift as education issues take on increased importance
for the NAACP’s Board of Directors. To understand why education comes
to occupy the majority of the NAACP’s agenda after the 1930s, it is
important to focus on the inner workings of the Garland Fund.
TABLE 1: NAACP Monthly Board Minutes, Mentions of the Important Issue Areas10
Even with the noblest intentions, funding radical causes and direct action
does not always lead to tangible results. Between 1923 and 1929, members
of the board of directors were feeling uninspired about the impact of the
Garland Fund’s existing grant portfolio. To help remedy this enthusiasm
gap, the Board of Directors decided to revise its grant making policy in May
1929. It was agreed by all members to no longer accept grant applications
10 Minutes of the Board of Directors 1911-1940 (on file with NAACP Papers, reel 1).
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss2/10
526 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
“but only projects sponsored by members of the board or its committee.”
Further, it was determined “the board should select its major projects
through special committees which shall be responsible for proposing
expenditures covering the different fields.”11 This shift in the Garland
Fund’s grant-making process from responding to applications from grantees
to designing programs for grantees set the Garland Fund and the NAACP
down a new path of civil rights development.
Very quickly, civil rights emerged as a priority issue and litigation as a
central strategy. Civil rights, the Garland Fund reasoned, was an ideal area
to have a revolutionary impact and the NAACP was perceived to be the
most effective civil rights legal organization in the country—a reputation
garnered through its anti-lynching activities. In theory, drafting a project
proposal was to be a collaborative process between the Garland Fund and
the NAACP—in reality, the Garland Fund wielded a lot of influence over
the NAACP due to its vast financial resources. The Garland Fund’s initial
plan was to give the NAACP a hefty grant of $100,000 to fund a series of
lawsuits in four areas of racial discrimination: education, Jim Crow cars,
jury discrimination, residential segregation. However, with the downturn in
the stock market, the eventual grant was reduced to a third of the original
grant and only one issue remained: school segregation.12
Throughout the process of developing this plan, the NAACP’s Walter
White and James Weldon Johnson protested the emphasis away from racial
violence to education in numerous ways.13 However, in a Jim Crow world,
where white men and women controlled the purse strings, White and
Johnson understood their place in the racial hierarchy and the importance
of compromise— even if it was unbalanced. If education was the area where
funding was available, the NAACP would expand its activism around
education. And after all, the NAACP cared deeply about segregated
education; it simply was not at the top of the organization’s agenda.
In the end, the education desegregation campaign proved to be both more
and less than the Garland Fund or the NAACP envisioned. The increased
focus on education had the unintended impact of reducing the NAACP’s
activism around issues related to racial violence and the campaign around
workers’ economic rights in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the campaign
also had the effect of dramatically transforming constitutional law with the
11. Minutes of the Board of Directors (May 14, 1929) (on file with AFPS Papers, box 2, reel 2).
12. Memorandum from Baldwin to Members of the Board (Oct. 18, 1929) (on file with AFPS Papers);
Letter (June 12, 1933) (on file with AFPS Papers, reel 23).
13. Letter from Walter White, NAACP, to James Weldon Johnson, NAACP (Mar. 10, 1930) (on file
with NAACP Papers, AFPS, Chronological File, 1922-1935, I C: 196); Letter from James Weldon
Johnson, NAACP, to Walter White, NAACP (Mar. 11, 1930) (on file with NAACP Papers. AFPS,
Chronological File, 1922-1935, I C: 196); Letter from Walter White, NAACP, to Morris Ernst, The
Garland Fund (Mar. 13, 1930) (on file with NAACP Papers. AFPS, Chronological File, 1922-1935, I C:
196); Memorandum from White to Committee on Negro Work (Sept. 13, 1933) (on file with AFPS
Papers, reel 23).
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momentous Brown v. Board of Education decision.
* * *
In the final analysis, it is my contention that the relationship between the
Garland Fund/NAACP resembles one of movement capture more than that
of collaboration. Archival records reveal that education was never
universally accepted as the centerpiece issue for the NAACP’s Black
leadership but the organization was caught in a difficult bind between the
desires of white liberals, a foundation with valuable resources, and the
urgent needs of their own racial group. Of course, the NAACP was not
alone in negotiating for greater control of its agenda with funders. SNCC,
CORE, and many organizations large and small fought and sometimes split
over questions of white influence over radical Black politics including,
specifically, the role that foundations would play in financing and shaping
the struggle.14 Rather than listen and engage in collective action problem
solving with grantees, funders often view themselves as the grand architects
of progress. Recognition that funders have been able to exert control over
grantee agendas is useful in understanding how relations of power
inequality become reproduced within purportedly progressive legal
movements.
Lastly, it is important for me to state that in no way am I arguing that
education was not a radical issue or that the NAACP did not care about
education. Education was (and still is) a transformative civil rights issue.
My disagreement is about the portrayal of the relationship between the
Garland Fund/NAACP around the development of the grant. It is not
enough that important issues are being addressed; the process matters and
those most acutely impacted should be the drivers of movement strategy
and goal formation.
I suspect that you have a different interpretation about this relationship,
and for that reason, I am greatly looking forward to this dialogue!
Yours,
Megan
14. ROBERT ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY (1969);
KAREN FERGUSON, TOP DOWN: THE FORD FOUNDATION, BLACK POWER, AND THE REINVENTION OF
RACIAL LIBERALISM (2013); MARIBEL MOREY, BORN IN COLONIAL AFRICA: THE ROOTS OF AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA (forthcoming 2020); ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1986); NOLIWE ROOKS, WHITE MONEY/BLACK POWER: THE SURPRISING HISTORY OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDIES AND THE CRISIS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2006); TIFFANY WILLOUGHBY-
HERARD, WASTE OF A WHITE SKIN: THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION AND THE RACIAL LOGIC OF WHITE
VULNERABILITY (2015); KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK
LIBERATION (2016).
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Dear Megan,
Wow, your new work on the Garland Fund and the NAACP shakes the
conventional story of American civil rights to its core. As far as I’m
concerned, it is the best work about the Fund and the NAACP since at least
the classic work of Merle Curti in 1959, and maybe ever.15 I’m hardly alone
in finding your work on the subject compelling.16 I’m certain its influence
will continue to spread in the coming months and years.
At the heart of your inquiry is the question of how education became a
centerpiece (the centerpiece?) of the twentieth-century NAACP program
when there were so many desperate injustices and crying needs crowding
onto the civil rights agenda. You posit that the education campaign that
eventually produced Brown v. Boardwas not actually the NAACP’s agenda
at all, at least not originally. In your account, the prominence of education
was a result of the organization’s capture by white liberals who led men like
James Weldon Johnson and Walter White into abandoning their
uncompromising program to stop violence against African-Americans. In
its place they adopted a less controversial program of education rights.
Along the way, you insist that we ask hard questions about the “production
of civil rights knowledge” and about how funders “exert influence over the
agenda of Black activists.”17
Like many of your readers to date, I share your sense that the question of
how education emerged as the leading civil rights program of the era usually
goes unasked. With rare exceptions, as you note, scholars in law and legal
history typically fail even to see that education’s emergence is a
phenomenon that needs to be explained.18 (Education historians,
interestingly, make no such mistake.19) You boldly suggest that behind this
failure in the literature lies a desire by white historians to tell a story about
civil rights that is “respectable and credible” and that effaces some of the
15. Merle Curti, Subsidizing Radicalism: The American Fund for Public Service, 1921-41, 33 SOC.
SERV. REV. 274 (1959).
16. E.g., Kelsey Piper, How ‘Movement Capture’ Shaped the Fight for Civil Rights, VOX (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/28/18241490/movement-capture-civil-rights-
philanthropy-funding; Matthew Grossman, How Philanthropy Diverts Social Movements, NISKANEN
CENTER SCIENCE OF POLITICS PODCAST (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.niskanencenter.org/how-
philanthropy-diverts-social-movements; Amy Costello, How Philanthropy ‘Captures’ Social
Movements, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/how-philanthropy-captures-
social-movements.
17. Francis, supra note 3, at 281.
18. A leading exception is RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
19. E.g., JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935 (1988); RONALD
E. BUTCHART, NORTHERN SCHOOLS, SOUTHERN BLACKS, AND RECONSTRUCTION: FREEDMEN’S
EDUCATION, 1862-1875 (1980); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, A CLASS OF THEIR OWN: BLACK TEACHERS IN
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (2007); HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, SELF-TAUGHT: AFRICAN AMERICAN
EDUCATION IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (2005);
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most brutal dimensions of the white supremacist regime of Jim Crow.
Sign me up for each of these parts of your story. The literature on civil
rights history will have to make substantial new room for your important
arguments and ideas.
Here’s what I don’t quite understand. You tell the story of the turn to
education as if it were a fall from grace: a fateful decision by the leading
civil rights organization in the country to pursue misleading liberal panaceas
in a world of violent oppression. My reading of the archives, however, leads
me to see a story of creativity and agency. Where you see the capture of the
NAACP, I see the NAACP coopting the Garland Fund. I don’t want to be
naïve. I sure don’t want to make the mistakes of white liberals before me.
But I see genius and agency where you see victimhood. W. E. B. Du Bois,
James Weldon Johnson, and Walter White, I think, acted forcefully and
effectively. For better and for worse, they slyly changed the Garland Fund’s
program. The Fund’s directors subtly redirected the NAACP, to be sure.
But the Fund did so not by encouraging an education agenda, but by pushing
the NAACP toward a more radical position on economics and labor. In what
follows I offer some of the evidence that has led me to this different, though
not entirely incompatible, view.
* * *
The American Fund for Public Service, better known as the Garland
Fund, aimed from the start, as you say, to support labor organizing
(“producers’ movements”) and to work for “the protection of minorities”
through publicity and legal defense. In the Fund’s first weeks, it supported
the NAACP’s effort to swing public opinion behind the anti-lynching bill
then before the Senate. Two and a half years later, the Fund financed the
NAACP’s defense of Ossian Sweet, the Black doctor in Detroit who was
prosecuted for murder when he defended himself, his friends, and his family
from a race riot on the front lawn of the home he had purchased on a white
block. The Fund also backed the NAACP’s first effort to raise funds for
legal defense, designed to protect African Americans from violence and
miscarriages of justice.20
Education, by contrast, was a field the Garland Fund avoided as best it
could. The Fund’s directors rejected application after application from
educational programs.21 Roger Baldwin, the most active member of the
20. KEVEN BOYLE, ARC OF JUSTICE: A SAGA OF RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND MURDER IN THE JAZZ AGE
(2004); GLORIA GARRETT SAMSON, THE AMERICAN FUND FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: CHARLES GARLAND
AND RADICAL PHILANTHROPY, 1922-1941 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Letter from B.D. McDougall to American Fund for Public Service (Apr. 1923) (on file
with American Fund for Public Service Records [hereinafter AFPSR], box 49, reel 31) (rejecting
proposal for experimental program in the Valparaiso public schools); Letter from Harry Kelly to Roger
Nash Baldwin (July 14, 1923) (on file with AFPSR, reel 30) (complaining of unfavorable treatment of
grant application by the Ferrer School in New Jersey); Letter from Roger Nash Baldwin to Charles J.
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Fund’s board of directors, explained to one such applicant in 1924 that
education was outside the scope of the Fund’s work.22 An internal policy
memo at the Fund later that year questioned whether education for children
was within the Fund’s mandate at all.23 Progressive educators reacted
incredulously and urged Baldwin and other directors to change their
stance.24 But the Fund stuck to its position.
The Fund’s directors were especially resistant to making education-
related grants when it came to Black education in the South. The Fund’s
directors explained that there were “already agencies in the field aiding
Negro education.”25 A survey commissioned by the Fund concluded that
“negro schools” in the South were well-funded thanks to foundations like
the Rockefeller-affiliated General Education Board and the Rosenwald
Fund.26 There was a deeper problem, too: leading African American
educators rarely shared the radical politics of the Fund’s directors.
How, then, did the directors of the Garland Fund eventually finance
Brown v. Board if they opposed funding efforts to improve Black education
per se? How did they come to help finance a civil rights campaign organized
around education? The answer lies in a well-orchestrated lobbying
campaign by Du Bois, Johnson, and White. The leaders of the NAACP
captured the white liberals and radicals at the Fund, not vice versa.
* * *
By the middle of the 1920s, the leaders of the NAACP thought they had
beaten back the worst of the lynching problem. To be sure, the Dyer anti-
lynching bill had failed in the Senate. But the Garland Fund-sponsored
publicity campaign around the bill seemed to have had substantial effect.
At least James Weldon Johnson thought so in 1924, when he cited the
NAACP’s propaganda efforts for the decline in lynchings from sixty-eight
in 1922 to twenty-eight in 1923 and only three in 1924.27 In 1926, the
organization marked its sense of success in this field when it transferred its
remaining anti-lynching publicity funds—a balance of $2,500 left over
from the Garland Fund’s 1922 and 1923 anti-lynching grants—to a savings
Rhoades (1924) (on file with AFPSR, box 51, reel 32) (rejecting application from Rhoades Ranch
School in Cody, Wyoming).
22. See, e.g., Letter from Roger Nash Baldwin to John Edelman (Feb. 26, 1924) (on file with AFPSR)
(reporting that “other things seem more important to practically all the members of this Board”).
23. Roger Nash Baldwin, A Few Questions Concerning Our Policy Which May Serve Members of the
Board of Directors in Preparing Memos (Dec. 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 1).
24. Letter from Henry B. Linville to AFPS (1925) (on file with AFPSR, reel 33).
25. Letter from A. T. McKinney, Houston Industrial Training School, to AFPS (1923) (on file with
AFPSR, box 48, reel 30).
26. The Labor Bureau, Inc: Survey (on file with AFPSR, box 7, reel 4).
27. James Weldon Johnson, Lynching – America’s National Disgrace, CURRENT HIST. 596-601
(January 1924).
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account so that it would accrue interest for future use.28
At virtually the same time, leading African American intellectuals in and
out of the NAACP made a turn to education for a number of reasons
independent of any philanthropic foundation. Alain Locke, for example,
decided in 1925 that the time had arrived for a new movement for Black
education.29 Du Bois had been pressing for education for more than a
decade.30 (For just as long, he had openly disdained the philanthropists who
supported Black education in the South.31)
A number of considerations prompted the turn toward education. The
Republican Party’s “lily white” strategy of the 1920s had closed off
electoral politics as a path for civil rights; no realistic chance arose for
another anti-lynching bill in the Congress until the New Deal.32 The cultural
and literary politics of the Harlem Renaissance emphasized the power of
intelligent Black culture.33 Specific controversies drew attention to
education, too. In 1921 and 1922, the Smith-Towner bill, which would have
created new federal funding for education, proposed to distribute school
resources through state authorities in such a way as to allow southern states
to discriminate between Black schools and white ones.34 As African
Americans moved from South to North in the Great Migration, new
segregation efforts arose in northern towns like Gary, Indiana, and Toms
River, New Jersey.35
The brilliant strategy of the NAACP leadership was to package its pre-
existing education strategy in the kinds of class- and labor-based terms the
directors of the Garland Fund would find compelling. Approaching the
Fund for a grant to support a study of racial inequality in the funding of
public schools in the South in late 1924, Du Bois asserted that “Negroes
form a large and increasingly important part of the laboring class in the
United States.”36 Johnson added that assistance to Black schools would help
Black children “to become as rapidly as possible an integral factor in the
industrial and labor world.”37 Du Bois made the point directly in a grant
28. ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 84 (1989).
29. Alain Locke, Negro Education Bids for Par, 54 SURV. GRAPHIC 567 (1925). See generally JEFFREY
C. STEWART, THE NEW NEGRO: THE LIFE OF ALAIN LOCKE 499-503 (2018) (describing Locke’s new
turn to liberal arts education for Black Americans).
30. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE COMMON SCHOOL AND THE NEGRO AMERICAN (1911); W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE
NEGRO COMMON SCHOOL: REPORT OF A SOCIAL STUDY MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ATLANTA
UNIVERSITY (1901); W.E.B. Du Bois, Negro Education, 15 THE CRISIS 173 (1918).
31. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, Gifts and Education, 29 THE CRISIS 151 (1925).
32. JOSHUA FARRINGTON, BLACK REPUBLICANS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GOP 17 (2016);
NANCY J. WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN 5-6 (1983).
33. DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, WHEN HARLEM WAS IN VOGUE (rev. ed. 1997).
34. PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 129-30 (2009).
35. DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER NORTHERN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, 1865-1954 (2005).
36. Letter from W.E.B. Du Bois to AFPS (Nov. 9, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7).
37. Letter from James Weldon Johnson to Roger Nash Baldwin (May 15, 1924) (on file with AFPSR,
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application in early 1925: “If now the Garland Fund wishes to encourage
organized labor among Negroes it must encourage intelligence among
Negroes. Negro education is today fatally deficient because of the lack of
elementary education in the South. The first step toward labor organization
among Negroes on any definite and lasting scale must be to reveal the plight
of the Negro common school.”38
Baldwin and other directors of the Fund did not immediately concur.
When Du Bois sought funding for his educational funding studies at the
NAACP’s journal The Crisis, the Fund directors at first demurred. Baldwin
reminded Du Bois that education was outside the Fund’s field of activity
and checked into alternative sources of funding with more traditional
financiers of Black education in the South.39 The big foundations had no
interest in supporting Du Bois.40 An insider at the Fund recommended
against granting Du Bois’s application because of Du Bois’s reputation for
“creating antagonism on the part of the white South.”41 Eventually,
however, the Fund came around, on the condition that Black education
“have the effect” Du Bois predicted it would for Black labor organizing.
The NAACP’s labor-oriented account of education had won the day and
turned the Fund to education.42
The same reasoning supported the NAACP’s proposal for a
desegregation campaign four years later. The Fund worried that the NAACP
had “no labor program.”43 Du Bois replied that grants to The Crisis and the
NAACP would “lead[] the race into industrial democracy and emancipation
from their present peonage.”44 As Walter White explained in 1930, the
Fund’s big desegregation grant aimed “to establish conditions and a
psychology which will put the Negro laborer, industrial and agricultural,
upon an equal basis as regards organization with white labor.”45
The NAACP’s co-optation of the Fund did not prevent influence from
running the other way, to be sure. The process of applying for education-
reel 2).
38. Memorandum from W.E.B. Du Bois to Mr. Johnson (Jan. 15, 1925) (on file with AFPSR, box 49,
reel 31), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b030-i079.
39. Letter from Roger Nash Baldwin to W.E.B. Du Bois (Nov. 28, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7);
Letter from Roger Nash Baldwin to James H. Dillard (Dec. 4, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7).
40. Letter from James H. Dillard to Roger Nash Baldwin (Dec. 17, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7);
Letter from T. J. Woofter, Jr. to James H. Dillard (Dec. 15, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7).
41. Letter from L. Hollingsworth Wood to Roger Nash Baldwin (Jan. 27, 1925) (on file with AFPSR,
reel 7).
42. Letter from Roger Nash Baldwin to W.E.B. Du Bois, (Jan. 29, 1925) (on file with AFPSR, reel 7).
43. Memorandum from Walter White to W.E.B. Du Bois (Jan. 23, 1930) (on file at
https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b055-i160).
44. Letter from W.E.B. Du Bois to James Weldon Johnson (Dec. 20, 1929) (on file at
https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312-b183-i015/#page/1/mode/1up).
45. Letter from Walter White to A. Philip Randolph (Oct. 7, 1930) (on file with AFPSR, box 54, reel
34); see also Memorandum from Committee on Negro Work to the Directors of the American Fund for
Public Service (on file with James Weldon Johnson and Grace Nail Johnson Papers, Beinecke Library,
Yale University (JWJP), box 1, folder 14).
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related financing from the Fund nudged the African American NAACP
leadership toward a left-leaning labor and class-oriented politics. At the
beginning of the 1920s, Mary White Ovington, a white member of the
NAACP’s board of directors, had bemoaned the economic conservativism
of James Weldon Johnson.46 By the latter part of the decade, Johnson had
learned to appeal to the radicalism of socialist and communist members of
the Fund’s board in supporting grant proposals from African American
applicants. He did not share their politics. Not by a long shot. But he and
White had learned something of the value of labor. A few short years later,
Du Bois would soon make his storied turn to Marxism and Black economic
nationalism.47
* * *
Undoubtedly there were lines of mutual influence running between the
NAACP and the Garland Fund. I’ve tried to describe some of them here
ever so briefly. I fear I’ve gone on too long!
One more observation for now: do you worry that the theory of movement
capture sells the NAACP too cheaply? For sure you’re right that the
organization was strapped for cash in the 1920s. But the Garland Fund and
its million dollars (two million eventually, after stock market growth in the
1920s) did not have hugely deep pockets, at least not for a philanthropic
foundation. I’ll have more to say in my next contribution comparing the
Garland Fund to the giant foundations of the era. But regardless, the Garland
Fund never offered the NAACP all that much money. The initial award may
have been an eye-popping $100,000. Ultimately, after the stock market
crash of 1929 decimated its remaining resources, the Fund ended up
contributing something more like $30,000 to the desegregation campaign.
Can a foundation buy a social mobilization as big and important as the civil
rights movement for a sum this tiny? Could philanthropists turn the heads
of people as serious as Johnson and White for a sum spread over five or six
years that amounted to only a third of the NAACP’s $50,000 annual budget?
That would be truly extraordinary—unless, as I suspect, the NAACP’s
savvy leaders managed to get a good deal back in return.
I’m interested to hear what you think!
Yours,
John
46. EUGENE LEVY, JAMES WELDON JOHNSON: BLACK LEADER, BLACK VOICE 185 (1973).
47. DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN
CENTURY, 1919-1963 (1993).
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Dear John,
Whew! Ok, that is a lot to unpack especially in a forum where I have so
little room.
But before doing so, I want to let you know how much I have enjoyed
disagreeing with you on parts of this story over the past few years. Instead
of being dogmatic, you have persistently asked “why” in a desire to
understand my perspective and not entirely to disprove. In my attempts to
answer the “why” at conferences and in this written dialogue, I’ve been
pushed to reexamine my assumptions, the literature, and the archives. In the
end, your critique made the article stronger and our continual (it won’t end
here) disagreement has proved productive in thinking through larger themes
in legal history such as historical methodology, racial capitalism, and the
role of philanthropies as legal intermediaries.
Within a constrained word limit, you crafted a magisterial narrative of the
Garland Fund and the NAACP. Your work takes us further than previous
studies that utilize a resource mobilization framework in proposing that
education was where the NAACP and Garland Fund’s interests intersected.
Instead, you propose that the NAACP’s agenda is not captured by the
Garland Fund nor do the interests of the organizations conveniently overlap;
in your analysis, the NAACP captures the Garland Fund and redirects their
funding into a direction that they were not initially willing to go. According
to you, it was the lobbying prowess, the steadfast will, and genius of James
Weldon Johnson, Walter White, and W.E.B. Du Bois to push for a
campaign centered on education desegregation that ultimately convinced
the Garland Fund to support its historic education desegregation campaign.
You are well situated to make this claim as your historical excavation of the
Garland Fund has no equal.
Yet, this redemptive account is at times deeply contradictory with my
own. I have spent a long time thinking about how we have come to such
radically different conclusions regarding the formation stage of the
NAACP’s campaign against segregated education –especially given that
many of the documents we used to construct our narratives are the same
(though I spent more time in the early NAACP documents and you have
spent more time in the later Garland Fund archives). I suspect that what
might partially drive this disagreement are different methodological
approaches to archive materials.
* * *
Admittedly, I read the archives for this article differently than I did for
my first book on the NAACP’s anti-lynching campaign. Since that time, I
have read the works of many postcolonial and feminist scholars who have
13
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transformed my orientation to archival research by drawing my attention to
the way power operates in archives and how it influences the decisions that
researchers make in the process of narrative formation.48 I read for what was
there and for what was not there; I attempted to read both sets of archives
in the context of Jim Crow racial dynamics; and, in an act of historical
reparations, I centered the perspective of the NAACP’s leaders above that
of the Garland Fund’s directors. This critical historical method allowed me
an opportunity to learn that disagreement and cooptation rarely look or
sound like how we think they should. In other words: by reading the
archives differently . . . I heard differently.
The historical methodology questions that animated my research include:
How do we confront and write about a history of civil rights lawmaking that
has been recorded during periods of severe economic inequality and white
supremacy? How do we tell stories of Black people trying to construct a
vision of civil rights before there were substantive civil rights legal
guarantees? And finally: How do we interrogate top-down sources to tell
stories from the bottom up?
I also tried to think through what “code switching” sounded like in the
late 1920s, and by that I mean how Black people change what they say and
how they talk when white people are around and or when they think white
people are listening. I did this to account for Du Bois’s theory of “double
consciousness,” which he described as “the sense of looking at one’s self
through the eyes of others,” and in particular, the need for Black people to
constantly think about how they are perceived by non-Black people.49 If we
believe Du Bois, then how might we incorporate his double consciousness
theoretical framework into our archival analysis of this period? How does
it disrupt and challenge how we traditionally read archives?
Myself, and the majority of Black people I know, code switch today—so,
surely, the NAACP’s Black leaders practiced some variation of code
switching in this earlier period when they interacted with white funders.
This does not mean that I did not take everything at face value in the
archives, but in my analysis, I probed deeper into the words that were
written or spoken when they directly involved the Garland Fund.
One example that I would like to highlight revolves around how to
interpret Walter White’s response to Morris Ernst (whom, I argue, led the
education charge at the Garland Fund). When pressed by Johnson on why
he had not written Ernst back, White responded: “At last here is the
48. LISA LOWE, THE INTIMACIES OF FOUR CONTINENTS (2015); MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT,
SILENCING THE PAST: POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORY (1st ed. 1995); ANN LAURA STOLER,
ALONG THE ARCHIVAL GRAIN: EPISTEMIC ANXIETIES AND COLONIAL COMMON SENSE (2009); Saidiya
Hartman, Venus in Two Acts, 12 SMALL AXE, no. 2, 1-14 (2008); Stephanie Smallwood, The Politics of
the Archive and History’s Accountability to the Enslaved, 6 HIST. PRESENT: J. CRITICAL HIST., no. 2,
117, 117-132 (2016).
49. W.E.B. DU BOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES 351 (1903).
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Memorandum drafted along the lines which you suggested. This is only a
rough copy for you, Lewis and Jim to use as a basis. I have no pride of
authorship, so don’t hesitate to speak frankly about it.”50 Read on its own,
it’s a bit innocuous, but when read in consideration of the power dynamics
at play and in context of the rest of White’s correspondence over the
previous decade (most of which is rapid and detailed), it is clear that he is
signaling his disapproval with the process by declaring he has “no pride of
authorship.” In many ways, White embodies the frustration of Black voices
in a Jim Crow racial order in which their perspectives are only made visible
when they comport with white notions of rights making.
This brief explanation of my historical methodology is perhaps partly
responsible for our divergences on two key aspects of the narrative that I
would like to elaborate on. First, the marginalization of the NAACP’s racial
violence campaign and second, the impact of the Garland Fund in enlarging
the education focus of the NAACP.
* * *
I am still unclear about how you explain the marginalization of the
NAACP’s racial violence campaign. In my reading, the NAACP’s concern
about lynching and mob violence did not diminish throughout the 1920s; a
review of the Board of Director minutes reveals that racial violence was the
issue the NAACP’s leadership was discussing the most.51 And this should
be no surprise because African Americans were still being lynched at
staggering rates—it went down slightly between 1923-1928 but increased
again during some of the years that cover the formation of this education
grant.52 If anything, racial violence was the NAACP’s flagship civil rights
issue (talked about at national board meetings, local meetings, and in the
pages of The Crisis). Thus, how could an issue at the forefront of the
NAACP’s agenda, at the core of the NAACP’s identity (the organization
was founded in response to a lynching), and championed by its leaders,
simply fall away? And how did education—an issue that was certainly
talked about by the NAACP’s leadership, but to a significantly lesser degree
than a host of other issues including racial violence, voting, and labor—rise
to the top?
What did shift in the 1920s was the NAACP’s strategy for fighting racial
violence: it moved away from publicity campaigns to legal campaigns.
Publicly, the NAACP claimed victory in their public opinion campaign but
50. Letter from Walter White to Morris Ernst (Mar. 28, 1930) (on file with NAACP Papers).
51. Megan Ming, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Politics, White Money, and Movement Capture 53 L.
& Soc’y Rev. 1 (2019).
52. Douglass Ekberg, Reported Victims of Lynching by Race: 1882-1964, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Susan B. Carter et al. ed., Cambridge Press
millennial ed. 2006) (see table Ec251-253).
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privately they were frustrated with the slow pace of progress.53 The
NAACP had spent considerable resources in trying to shape the hearts and
minds of white Americans, but after many years, those efforts yielded few
results. In contrast, the Supreme Court victory in Moore v. Dempsey (1923)
marked a significant turning point for the NAACP, and the organization
immediately shifted to a courtroom strategy.54 One of the many lessons
fromMoorewas the utility of law (versus publicity and legislation) as a tool
to fight racial injustice.55 For example, at a 1923 board meeting, the NAACP
announced the launch of a new legal defense fund, which aimed to raise
$25,000-50,000.56 And in the year after Moore was decided, the NAACP
noted a considerable increase in legal defense for issues pertaining to racial
violence.57 Specifically, the NAACP was concerned about coerced
confessions, jury discrimination, and death penalty or “legal lynchings” of
African Americans. And in much correspondence with the Garland Fund
between 1924-1929, Johnson makes it clear that these issues were of vital
importance—going so far as to rank these issues as of highest concern to
the NAACP.58
You are absolutely right that the NAACP was becoming more concerned
about education near the end of the 1920s. I’ll even concede the NAACP
was excited to build a litigation campaign around segregated education with
financial support from the Garland Fund. I have no doubt that an education-
focused rights program was the most the NAACP could have gotten out of
the Garland Fund. But up until the beginning of the negotiation around this
grant, education was not at the top of the NAACP’s agenda. And I cannot
help but wonder, in a world—a different world—that did not limit the full
arc of Black freedom dreams, what else could have been possible?
* * *
I have come to believe that a central reason why analyses of this earlier
period overlook the significance of the NAACP’s racial violence campaign
53. NAACP Anti-Lynching Committee, Meeting Notes, (Nov. 14, 1919) (on file with NAACP Archives,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Tenth Annual Report for the Year 1919 (on file with
NAACP archives, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
54. MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE
(2014); JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, ALONG THIS WAY (1938); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE:
THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).
55. MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE (2014).
56. Board of Director Minutes, (February 5, 1923) (on file with the NAACP Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
57. Board Minutes (Feb. 5, 1923) (on file with NAACP Archives, Library of Congress); Fourteenth
Annual Report for the Year 1923 (on file with NAACP Archives, Library of Congress); Fifteenth Annual
Report for the Year 1924 (on file with NAACP Archives, Library of Congress).
58. Memorandum from James Weldon Johnson to the NAACP Board of Directors on Policy of the Fund
as It relates to the Negro as a Minority Group, (Apr. 25, 1924) (on file with AFPS Papers); Letter from
Johnson to Baldwin (May 15, 1924) (on file with AFPS Papers); James Weldon Johnson, Synopsis for
Program (June 27, 1930) (on file with NAACP Papers. AFPS, Chronological File, 1922-1935, I C: 196).
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is largely a result of examining the NAACP through a purely racial lens.
The widely held understanding of the NAACP follows roughly along these
lines: the NAACP was a race organization, it frequently called out racial
injustices, and the historic fight for education equality was waged over the
color line. I’m not suggesting this interpretation is incorrect—the NAACP
was an organization centered on fighting racism in America. However,
viewing the NAACP through this narrow lens only tells us one part of the
NAACP’s story. Missing is how closely the NAACP tied its critique of
racism to a critique of capitalism.
I hope the difference in how we assemble our narratives about the
NAACP/Garland Fund relationship might open up room to think about how
a focus on racial capitalism would transform analyses of this period and
shift our conclusions. To be sure, the making of civil rights law is replete
with analyses about how race and racism shape the development of
constitutional law, but not enough analyses have worked through the role
of race and capitalism.59
A focus on racial capitalism in the NAACP’s early years brings the full
complexity of the organization into view. Like many Black radicals of the
time, the NAACP’s leadership understood the racial inequality experienced
by African Americans was deeply tied to the economic order.60 Because
race is an issue that overwhelms, it has been rare for legal historians to
locate a critical class analysis inside of the early NAACP. Instead, scholars
such as yourself suggest interaction with the Garland Fund was instrumental
in nudging the NAACP to develop a left-leaning labor and class-oriented
politics. However, I think this perspective gives the Garland Fund too much
credit.
Since at least the mass slaughter of African Americans in East St. Louis
in 1917, and pushed forward by the racial pogrom during the red summer
of 1919, the NAACP was actively engaged in Black organizing (around
peonage labor and exploitative sharecropping contracts) in the South. Du
Bois was constantly sounding the alarm in The Crisis about the hostility of
white labor unions to Black workers. And, Moore v Dempsey, the case the
NAACP spent 1919-1923 litigating, was ultimately about the legitimacy of
Black workers organizing into labor unions. In other words, long before the
Garland Fund came along, the NAACP had already tied a vision of racial
justice to the undoing of the predatory capitalist state.
59. Notable exceptions include W. E. B DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935); RISA
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); SOPHIA LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical
Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest
of America, 41 L. & SOC’Y INQUIRY 1006 (2016).
60. DU BOIS, supra note 59; PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2011); GOLUBOFF, supra note 59; LEE,
supra note 59; WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WALTER WHITE
(1948); Aziz Rana, Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 263 (2015).
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But it is not only that the NAACP’s critique of capitalism and embrace
of left labor politics preceded the Garland Fund; integrating a focus on
capitalism unmasks the expanding usefulness of racial violence to white
supremacist statecraft. African Americans were lynched because of their
race but also because violence served capitalism. According to the
NAACP’s leadership, lynching and mob violence used to protect white
economic power and to ensure a captive Black labor force.61 Because
violence was so closely tied to racism and capitalist exploitation, it seems
unlikely the NAACP independently shifted its agenda away from racial
violence to education. My purpose in stressing the racial violence issue is
not to undermine the eventual education campaign but simply to point out
there were paths not taken and to ask what that means for the types of rights
we have today and how we might construct them in the future.
Finally, I want to address the last point you raised about the amount of
money on offer from the Garland Fund. You point out that it was not that
much compared to the grantmaking of other big foundations of that period,
but the assessment of different grants is relative and contextual; what might
seem like a paltry amount to one organization will be transformative to
another. Numerous studies have detailed the co-optation of radical
grassroots movements for seemingly small amounts of funding.62 To
provide some perspective on the significance of the Garland Fund’s
grantmaking to the NAACP: no foundations or large donors ($1,000 and
over) contributed to the NAACP before the Garland Fund got involved in
1922.63 Wealthy donors stayed away from the NAACP because it was
viewed as too radical. In comparison, the National Urban League received
funding from five foundations including Rockefeller and Carnegie. The
NAACP mainly fundraised through its membership and was constantly
trying to raise funds in order to undertake larger projects but with little
success. Thus, in consideration of the NAACP’s fundraising past, the initial
promise of $100,000 (and the eventual ~$30,000) was tremendous.
* * *
Our inquiry is historical, but it resonates in the contemporary moment as
the growth in economic inequality and explosion in private philanthropies
contributing to radical social movements has heightened the need to
61. See, e.g., Martha Gruening & W.E.B. Du Bois, The Massacre of East St. Louis, 14 THE CRISIS 219
(1917); Walter White, Arkansas Race Riots Laid to Bad System, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1919;
Walter White, Massacring Whites in Arkansas, 109 THE NATION 715 (1919).
62. ROBERT ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1969); INCITE!, THE REVOLUTION
WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2007); ERIC KOHL-ARENAS,
THE SELF-HELP MYTH: HOW PHILANTHROPY FAILS TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY (2016); Benjamin
Marquez, Mexican-American Political Organizations and Philanthropy: Bankrolling a Social
Movement, 77 SOC. SERV. 329 (2003).
63. Memorandum (Jan. 14, 1924) (on file with AFPS Papers, box 7, reel 4).
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understand the relationship between funders and grantees. You and I have
gone back and forth about different aspects of the period covering the initial
articulation of the education campaign, but I wonder if there is room for
parts of both of our interpretations to exist together? The Garland Fund
could have constrained the trajectory of the NAACP’s agenda at a certain
point, but the NAACP’s leaders and foot soldiers could have also
reconstructed the terms of what was possible into something so powerful
that it ended up changing the course of constitutional law—in ways the
Garland Fund could not have even imagined. An education desegregation
litigation campaign may not have been the original plan, but it was a damn
good one!
I think it is crucial to account for this story of Black rights-making
through the impossible. But I would caution us not to mistake these victories
gained through contestation as the goals at the beginning of the struggle.
That does not denigrate the results that were ultimately achieved—it simply
calls our attention to the process of struggle and how different institutions
and actors mediated the development of civil rights.
At the end of the day, I think our work showcases the messiness and
dynamism of focusing on funder/grantee relationships as it pertains to legal
change. I continue to learn from you, and I’m excited for your book on the
Garland Fund as it will add much needed background and nuance to one of




Thanks for your reply. After reading your powerful counter-arguments, I
think I wish you were enjoying our disagreements a little less!
As I read it, your reply takes up three important questions I want to
address: the NAACP’s posture toward lynching in the mid-1920s; economic
radicalism in the NAACP leadership; and the relationship between
philanthropy and African-American education. As you know better than
most, the themes we’re taking up are central threads in the long-standing
historical literature on African American political mobilization in the
century after Emancipation.
First, some points of strong agreement. Archives are tricky and full of lies
and half-truths, for sure, and nowhere more so than in the complicated and
fraught context of racial politics. My favorite examples of this come from
the War of 1812, when newspapers in the Chesapeake ran stories describing
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dastardly British efforts to steal enslaved persons for sale in the West Indies.
A naïve reader encountering such stories in the archive might think these
old stories recounted a truth. In fact they were propaganda efforts designed
to deter the region’s slaves from running off for freedom with British
raiding parties.64 Another example comes from your side of the disciplinary
street: political scientists in the tradition of Leo Strauss have long studied
esoteric language that conveys hidden meanings to specialized audiences.65
So for sure, the archives of the 1920s are full of strategic communication
and selective self-presentation, though I suppose of a very different kind
than Straussians usually study. I’m happy to follow you and call it code-
switching. There’s little doubt in my mind that the student of American race
politics needs to be on the look-out for people switching and swerving
between idioms to satisfy the strategic imperatives of the moment.66
I also agree wholeheartedly that Moore v. Dempsey plays a crucial and
often under-estimated role in orienting the NAACP.67 After the Dyer Anti-
lynching Bill failed in the Senate late in 1922, the Supreme Court’s early
1923 decision in Moore suggested to men like Johnson and White that
litigation might be more promising than electoral politics. Moore plays a
significant role in my in-progress book on the Garland Fund.68
Yet there are, as you say, some persistent points of disagreement in our
accounts.
The NAACP and Lynching in the mid-1920s
My own reading of the NAACP’s internal correspondence and records,
as well as its public materials, is that the attention it paid to the lynching
problem diminished between the failure of the Dyer Bill in 1922 and the
Garland Fund’s grant in 1930. The anti-lynching campaign, which notably
itself had begun in 1916 in response to a gift offer from wealthy white
lawyer Philip G. Peabody,69 had completed its cycle with the Dyer Bill
64. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73 (2012); see
also SYLVIA FREY, WATER FROM THE ROCK: BLACK RESISTANCE IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (1991).
65. LEO STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING (1952); see also ARTHUR M. MELTZER,
PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES (2014).
66. A foundational text in this for me has been Robin D. G Kelley, “We Are Not What We Seem:
Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the Jim Crow South, 80 J. AM HIST. 75 (1993).
67. 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
68. The facts underlying the Moore decision offer one of the starkest examples of the connection you
draw between racial violence and economics. The murder of upwards of 200 black sharecroppers in
Arkansas in 1919 was part of a concerted effort to seize the cotton in the fields at a moment in which
the price of cotton on world markets had skyrocketed. You write that such violence supported “racial
capitalism” and that the “violence served capitalism.” I don’t know that I can unpack this assertion here.
But there is no doubt that racial violence and lynching often advanced the economic interests of many
white southerners. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE
ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988); ROBERT WHITAKER, ON THE LAPS OF GODS: THE RED SUMMER OF
1919 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE THAT REMADE A NATION (2008); NAN ELIZABETH WOODRUF,
AMERICAN CONGO: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN THE DELTA (2014).
69. CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS CONFRONT LYNCHING: STRATEGIES OF
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episode. It is a hard thing to say that attention to brutal and harrowing public
murders diminished. The horror of each new lynching remained then and
remains now. The threat and the reality of violence persisted, and the fact
of any lynchings at all is a dreadful thing. But the NAACP’s own count of
lynchings led them to believe that the numbers were dropping precipitously
during the period, by more than 50% and then by more than 90%.70 The
kind of mass public spectacle lynching that marred earlier decades nearly
disappeared.71
For me, valuable evidence of the NAACP’s shifting internal priorities
comes in 1926 when we can see what they did with their own money when
they had choices. In that year, the NAACP leadership set aside its anti-
lynching resources. Johnson and White transferred funds earmarked for
anti-lynching to a savings account for future use. By the mid-1920s, in other
words, the NAACP leadership was no longer spending its own available
anti-lynching money, let alone asking for more such money from others.
Opposition to lynching remained a top priority in many respects. But I take
it that leaders like Johnson and White were choosing to save anti-lynching
funds for a rainy day.72 There is no evidence that Du Bois objected. Indeed,
the more radical Du Bois became, the less interest he had in what he
characterized as the NAACP’s traditional anti-lynching work.73
Economic Radicalism and the NAACP’s Compromises with the World
I also want to express caution about your attribution of economic
radicalism to the NAACP leadership in the 1920s. Many readers will recall
the infamous 1931 clash between the NAACP and the Communist Party
over the Scottsboro Boys case. The differences between the two
organizations rested on their deep disagreements over radical economics.74
A similar contest between the two groups took place the year before when
they competed for the grant that the Garland Fund ultimately made to the
NAACP.75 There were, to be sure, underappreciated African American
critics of capitalism in the 1920s United States. But most Black critics of
RESISTANCE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 66-68 (2009); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO,
THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 28-29 (1980).
70. Memorandum from James Weldon Johnson on the Policy of the Fund as it Relates to the Negro as
a Minority Group (May 15, 1924) (on file with AFPSR, box 49, reel 31).
71. AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
(2009).
72. ZANGRANDO, supra note 28, at 84.
73. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE CONCEPT
290 (1940) (“The bulk of my colleagues saw no essential change in the world. It was the same world
with the problems to be attacked with the same methods as before the war. All we needed to do was
continue to attack lynching, to bring more cases before the courts, and to insist upon our full
citizenship.”).
74. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 2007); JAMES
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
75. LEVY, supra note 46, at 335-37.
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capitalism on the left were emphatically not in the NAACP.76
James Weldon Johnson, who led the organization through the 1920s,
came out of the 1910s (as left-leaning NAACP director Mary White
Ovington said) “hopelessly reactionary on labor.”77 Johnson told the
Garland Fund’s economic radicals that the labor movement and left
economic proposals “touch the Negro in hardly more than an indirect
way.”78 Johnson himself rejected most left economic views. And even
though he worried that “the great majority of Negroes” did not pay
sufficient attention to “the economic basis of the Negro’s condition,” he still
discouraged African Americans from pursuing radical economic politics.79
Indeed, Johnson wrote a book contending that economic revolution would
have no effect on the racial problem at all. Changing the problem of racial
attitudes, he argued, would be an independent effort “whatever form the
government might take on.”80 Johnson’s deputy and successor Walter White
famously made his commitments clear when he broke sharply with Du Bois
over economic questions in the early 1930s.81
There were exceptions, to be sure. NAACP insider William Pickens was
an economic radical. Pickens had been trained in labor radicalism at
Brookwood College, which the Garland Fund supported.82 The Garland
Fund relied on Pickens’s advice. But the NAACP often did not, largely
rejecting Pickens’s suggestions in 1927 to shift attention toward “working
people and labor groups” within the African American community and
ignoring his urgent suggestions to get more heavily involved in the
Scottsboro affair.83
And of course, Du Bois would eventually make a historic turn into
economic radicalism that would lead to his break with the NAACP and his
departure from The Crisis in 1934. But his views about economic questions
had evolved substantially between the mid-1920s and the famous split.84
76. CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION 197
(new ed. 2000) (describing “the Black elite” and the NAACP as “ideologically reactionary”); ROBIN D.
G. KELLY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 181 (2015
ed.) (describing tensions between working-class and communist African-Americans and the NAACP’s
middle-class membership). This is not to say that the NAACP never took up the cause of black labor.
See, e.g., Bernard Eisenberg, Only for the Bourgeois? James Weldon Johnson and the NAACP, 1916-
1930, 2 PHYLON 110, 110-24 (1982).
77. LEVY, supra note 46, 185.
78. Johnson, supra note 70.
79. Letter from James Weldon Johnson to Jacob Baker, Vanguard Press (n.d.) (on file with JWJP, box
2, folio 33).
80. JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, NEGRO AMERICANS, WHAT NOW? 10 (1934).
81. SULLIVAN, supra note 6; EDWARD WALDRON, WALTER WHITE AND THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE
(1978); WHITE, supra note 60.
82. SHELDON AVERY, UP FROM WASHINGTON: WILLIAM PICKENS AND THE NEGRO STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY, 1900-1954 (1989).
83. LEVY, supra note 46, 220-21; SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 147-53.
84. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON VIEWING MY LIFE
FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY 290, 308 (1968) (contrasting his views on communist
economics in 1926 and 1934).
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Biographers like David Levering Lewis rightly cite the Scottsboro episode
as the source of Du Bois’s engagement with left economic critiques of
capitalism.85 His trip to the Soviet Union in 1928 played a role as well.86
But the Garland Fund also nudged Du Bois and other NAACP leaders
toward a kind of provisional, tactical economic radicalism. The NAACP
pitched its grant applications in a way to appeal not so much to the education
interests of the Fund (the fund was not especially interested in education)
but to the Fund’s labor radicalism. Even this tactical adoption of economic
radicalism by the NAACP leadership would give way once more in the
1940s and 1950s under the pressure of the Cold War and the views of a new
generation of leaders.87 And as for the 1920s, Du Bois’s retrospective
analysis of the situation seems definitive. “The crusade waged by the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1910 to
1930,” he wrote looking back from 1940, was “one of the finest efforts of
liberalism to achieve human emancipation.” But the NAACP’s liberalism,
Du Bois contended, was insufficient precisely because it “had for its object
simply free entrance into the present economy of the world.” The NAACP,
Du Bois commented, had no theory of “the tyranny which now dominated
industrial life.”88
All that said, I think nonetheless that the question of the NAACP
leadership and radical economics brings us to a deep insight at the core of
your account, one that is worth drawing to the surface.
“I cannot help but wonder,” you write, “in a world—a different world—
that did not limit the full arc of Black freedom dreams, what else could have
been possible?” Now we’re at the heart of the matter. The NAACP
leadership did not arrive at its non-radicalism in a first-best world. Far from
it. Men like Johnson and White took some parts of the world as they found
them. From where they stand, taking on capitalism alongside racism seemed
likely to add to their burdens, not solve them. Dealing with Jim Crow
seemed difficult enough. There is no evidence that they secretly held more
radical views than they expressed. But like all of us, their views were forged
in the cauldron of the world, with its many pressures and constraints. Their
projects undoubtedly reflected compromises that the world pressed on
them. They worked with a world that was profoundly not of their own
making—indeed, a world that had been made to subordinate them.
Foundations, Capture, and Cooptation
The literature on African-American education in the South is centrally
85. LEWIS, supra note 47, at 256-65 (2000); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 155.
86. DU BOIS, supra note 73, at 287 (“Never in my life have I been so stirred as by what I saw during
two months in Russia.”)
87. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 370; see also GOLUBOFF, supra note 4.
88. DU BOIS, supra note 73, at 288-89.
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occupied with precisely the kinds of questions you have raised about
philanthropy and its influence.89 Examples of capture and influence abound
in the story of Black education in the South. Soon after the end of the Civil
War, the Peabody Fund denied its considerable financial resources to public
school systems adopting racially mixed schools.90 Northern philanthropy
pushed segregated Black education in the direction of industrial-style
training.91 Leading voices in the literature contend that philanthropists’
attention to education itself served alternately to “fit the freedmen to a new
form of servitude” or to distract the Black community from more effective
means of advancement such as politics and economic development.92
There is even a family connection here. Roger Baldwin’s uncle William
H. Baldwin, Jr., is one of the central figures in the education philanthropy
literature. The senior Baldwin served as a trustee at Tuskegee and earned
the scorn of Du Bois for efforts to limit the kinds of education received by
African-American youth to Tuskegee-style industrial education rather than
the liberal arts.93
By the time the Garland Fund came along, leading figures in the NAACP
had already clashed with some of the biggest philanthropic foundations in
the country. Thomas Jesse Jones led the Phelps-Stokes Fund, which made
him perhaps the leading figure in philanthropy for Black education in the
United States. In 1918, Du Bois condemned Jones as aiming to “deliberately
shut the door of opportunity in the face of bright Negro students.”94 A few
years later, Du Bois tangled with wealthy Wall Street lawyers L.
Hollingsworth Wood and Paul Cravath over efforts by the Rockefeller-
89. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 18; HILARY GREEN, EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: AFRICAN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890 (2016); Donald G. Nieman, Introduction to
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1900, vii-xi (Daniel Nieman ed., 1994);
James D. Anderson, Northern Foundations and the Shaping of Southern Black Rural Education, 1902-
1935, 18 HIST. ED. Q. 371, 371-96 (1978); Fitchue, Locke and Du Bois: Two Major Black Voices
Muzzled by Philanthropic Organizations, 14 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED., Winter 1996-1997, at 111, 111-
16; Marybeth Gasman, W.E.B. Du Bois and Charles S. Johnson: Differing Views on the Role of
Philanthropy in Higher Education, 42 HIST. ED. Q. 493 (2002); J. M. Stephen Peeps, Northern
Philanthropy and the Emergence of Black Higher Education — Do-Gooders, Compromisers, or Co-
Conspirators?, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH, supra, at 293-309.
90. WILLIAM P. VAUGHN, SCHOOLS FOR ALL: THE BLACKS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH,
1865-1877, 142-58 (1974); F. Bruce Rosen, The Influence of the Peabody Fund on Education in
Reconstruction Florida, 55 FLA. HIST. Q. 310-20 (1977); William P. Vaughn, Partners in Segregation:
Barnas Sears and the Peabody Fund, 10 CIVIL WAR HIST. 260, 264-68 (1964).
91. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 70-78; BUTCHART, supra note 19.
92. ANDERSON, supra note 19; BUTCHART, supra note 19; JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 37-38 (1994); Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr., The American
Compromise: Charles W. Eliot, Black Education, and the New South, in EDUCATION AND THE RISE OF
THE NEW SOUTH, 26-46 (Ronald K. Goodenow & Arthur O. White eds., 1981); Fairclough, Being in the
Field of Education, and Also Being a Negro . . . Seems Tragic: Black Teachers in the Jim Crow South,
87 J. AM. HIST. 65, 65-91 (2000).
93. ERIC ANDERSON & ALFRED A. MOSS, DANGEROUS DONATIONS: NORTHERN PHILANTHROPY AND
SOUTHERN EDUCATION 64-65 (1999) (interestingly, Anderson and Moss defend the elder Baldwin from
some of Du Bois’s criticisms); ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 82.
94. W.E.B. Du Bois, supra note 30, at 175-76.
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financed General Education Board to take control of the historically Black
Fisk University in Nashville.95
The Rockefeller’s General Education Board dwarfed the tiny accounts of
the Garland Fund. By 1909, John Rockefeller, Sr., had donated $53 million
to the GEB.96 In the early 1930s, GEB grants totaled $5.5 million each
year.97
Yet even with the biggest fortunes in the world, the literature on
philanthropy and education now increasingly attends to the ways in which
beneficiaries such as Black educators co-opted philanthropists’ projects for
their own. Horace Mann Bond and other Black educators, as one recent
historian puts it, “used the foundations for his own purposes.” In the
industrial education programs favored by white philanthropists, Black
educators often added precisely the kinds of liberal arts content that
industrial education aimed to foreclose. (Segregation helped in at least one
respect, since it offered a kind of freedom from white surveillance.98)
Of course, the politics of educational philanthropy are exceedingly
complex and double edged. Philanthropists set an agenda, which Black
educators in part subverted. Teachers, as Glenda Gilmore has suggested,
functioned as “double agents” in the politics of race. And indeed the
literature is racing to add the contributions of Black teachers alongside
white philanthropists.99
Capture seems to me to be a complex two-way street. The Garland Fund
nudged the NAACP toward radical economics and labor organizing. In turn,
savvy actors in the NAACP pushed the Fund toward education. The result
was an amalgam of multiple agendas, one that careered through the middle
of the twentieth century and whose after-effects still reverberate today.
Yours,
John
95. Donald Johnson, W.E.B. DuBois, Thomas Jesse Jones and the Struggle for Social Education, 1900-
1930, 85 J. NEGRO HIST. 71, 71-95 (2000); David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for
Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963, at 133-40.
96. HENRY ALLEN BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH: FROM 1619 TO THE
PRESENT 122 (1967).
97. JOHN ENSOR HARR & PETER J. JOHNSON, THE ROCKEFELLER CENTURY: THREE GENERATIONS OF
AMERICA’S GREATEST FAMILY 195 (1988).
98. WAYNE J. URBAN, BLACK SCHOLAR: HORACE MANN BOND, 1904-1972 (1992); Wayne J. Urban,
Philanthropy and the Black Scholar: The Case of Horace Mann Bond, 58 J. NEGRO ED. 478, 478-93
(1989).
99. BUTCHART, supra note 19; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 19; GREEN, supra note 84; WILLIAMS, supra
note 19; see also James D. Anderson, Ex-Slaves and the Rise of Universal Education, in EDUCATION
AND THE RISE OF THE NEW SOUTH, supra note 92, at 1, 1-25; Howard N. Rabinowitz, Half a Loaf: The
Shift from White to Black Teachers in the Negro Schools of the Urban South, 1865-1890, in AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1900, supra note 89, at 313-42.
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